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Abstract
The 1996 Child Pornography Prevention Act (CPPA) extended the existing federal criminal laws against
child pornography to include certain types of “virtual porn”. In 2002, the United States Supreme Court
found that portions of the CPPA, being overly broad and restrictive, violated First Amendment rights.
The Court ruled that images containing an actual minor or portions of a minor are not protected, while
computer generated images depicting a fictitious “computer generated” minor are constitutionally pro-
tected. In this report I outline various forms of digital tampering, placing them in the context of this
recent ruling. I also review computational techniques for detecting doctored and virtual (computer gen-
erated) images.
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1 Introduction
The past decade has seen remarkable growth in our
ability to capture, manipulate, and distribute digital
images. The average user today has access to high-
performance computers, high-resolution digital cam-
eras, and sophisticated photo-editing and computer
graphics software. And while this technology has led
to many exciting advances in art and science, it has
also led to some complicated legal issues. In 1996, for
example, the Child Pornography Prevention Act (CPPA)
extended the existing federal criminal laws against child
pornography to include certain types of “virtual porn”.
In 2002 the United States Supreme Court found that
portions of the CPPA, being overly broad and restric-
tive, violated First Amendment rights. The Court ruled
that images containing an actual minor or portions of a
minor are not protected, while “computer generated”
depicting a fictitious minor are constitutionally pro-
tected. This ruling naturally leads to some important
and complex technological questions – given an image
how can we determine if it is authentic, has been tam-
pered with, or is computer generated?
In this report I outline various forms of digital tam-
pering, and review computational techniques for de-
tecting digitally doctored and virtual (computer gen-
erated) images. I also describe more recent and emerg-
ing technologies that may further complicate the legal
issues surrounding digital images and video.
2 Digital Tampering
It probably wasn’t long after Nice´phore Nie´pce cre-
ated the first permanent photographic image in 1826
that tampering with photographs began. Some of the
most notorious examples of early photographic tam-
pering were instigated by Lenin, when he had “ene-
mies of the people” removed from photographs, Fig-
ure 1. This type of photographic tampering required
a high degree of technical expertise and specialized
equipment. Such tampering is, of course, much eas-
ier today. Due to the inherent malleablilty of digital
images, the advent of low-cost and high-performance
computers, high-resolution digital cameras, and sophis-
ticated photo-editing and computer graphics software,
the average user today can create, manipulate and al-
ter digital images with relative ease. There are many
different ways in which digital images can be manip-
ulated or altered. I describe below six different cate-
gories of digital tampering – the distinction between
these will be important to the subsequent discussion
of the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling on the CPPA.
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Figure 1: Lenin and Trotsky (top) and the result
of photographic tampering (bottom) that removed,
among others, Trotsky.
2.1 Composited
Compositing is perhaps the most common form of dig-
ital tampering, a typical example of which is shown
in Figure 2. Shown in the top panel of this figure is
an original image, and shown below is a doctored im-
age. In this example, the tampering consisted of over-
laying the head of another person (taken from an im-
age not shown here), onto the shoulders of the original
kayaker.
Beginning with the original image to be altered, this
type of compositing was a fairly simple matter of: (1)
finding a second image containing an appropriately
posed head; (2) overlaying the new head onto the orig-
inal image; (3) removing any background pixels around
the new head; and (4) re-touching the pixels between
the head and shoulders to create a seamless match.
These manipulations were performed in Adobe Photo-
shop, and took approximately 30 minutes to complete.
The credibility of such a forgery will depend on how
well the image components are matched in terms of
size, pose, color, quality, and lighting. Given a well
matched pair of images, compositing, in the hands of
an experienced user, is fairly straight-forward.
Figure 2: An original image (top) and a composited
image (bottom). The original images were down-
loaded from freefoto.com.
2.2 Morphed
Image morphing is a digital technique that gradually
transforms one image into another image. Shown in
Figure 3, for example, is the image of a person (the
source image) being morphed into the image of an alien
doll (the target image). As shown, the shape and ap-
pearance of the source slowly takes on the shape and
appearance of the target, creating intermediate images
that are “part human, part alien”. This morphed se-
quence is automatically generated once a user estab-
lishes a correspondence between similar features in the
source and target images (top panel of Figure 3). Im-
age morphing software is commercially and freely avail-
able – the software (xmorph) and images used in creat-
ing Figure 3 are available atxmorph.sourceforge.net.
It typically takes approximately 20 minutes to create
the required feature correspondence, although several
iterations may be needed to find the feature correspon-
dence that yields the visually desired morphing effect.
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Figure 3: Shown on top are two original images over-
layed with the feature correspondence required for
morphing. Shown below are five images from a mor-
phed sequence.
Figure 4: An original image of the actor Paul New-
man (left), and a digitally re-touched image of a
younger Newman (right).
2.3 Re-touched
The term morphing has been applied by non-specialist
to refer to a broader class of digital tampering which I
will refer to as re-touching. Shown in Figure 4, for ex-
ample, is an original image of the actor Paul Newman,
and a digitally re-touched younger Newman. This tam-
pering involved lowering the hairline, removing wrin-
kles, and removing the darkness under the eyes. These
manipulations were a simple matter of copy and past-
ing small regions from within the same image – e.g.,
the wrinkles were removed by duplicating wrinkle-
free patches of skin onto the wrinkled regions. While
this form of tampering can, in the hands of an expe-
rienced user, shave a few years off of a person’s ap-
pearance, it cannot create the radical changes in facial
structure needed to produce a, for example, 12-year
old Newman.
Figure 5: An original image (top left) and the image
enhanced to alter the color (top right), contrast (bot-
tom left) and blur of the background cars (bottom
right). The original image was downloaded from
freefoto.com.
2.4 Enhanced
Shown in Figure 5 are an original image (top left), and
three examples of image enhancement: (1) the blue
motorcycle was changed to cyan and the red van in
the background was changed to yellow; (2) the con-
trast of the entire image was increased, making the
image appear to have been photographed on a bright
sunny day; (3) the parked cars were blurred creating
a narrower depth of focus as might occur when pho-
tographing with a wide aperture. This type of manip-
ulation, unlike compositing, morphing or re-touching
is often no more than a few mouse clicks away in Pho-
toshop.
While this type of tampering cannot fundamentally
alter the appearance or meaning of an image (as with
compositing, morphing and re-touching), it can still
have a subtle effect on the interpretation of an image
– for example, simple enhancements can obscure or
exaggerate image details, or alter the time of day in
which the image appears to have been taken.
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Figure 6: A computer generated model (left) and the
resulting rendered image (right), by Alceu Baptista˜o.
2.5 Computer Generated
Composited, morphed, re-touched and enhanced im-
ages, as described in the previous sections, share the
property that they typically alter the appearance of an
actual photograph (either from a digital camera, or a
film camera that was then digitally scanned). Com-
puter generated images, in contrast, are generated en-
tirely by a computer and a skilled artist/programmer
(see Sections 6.1 and 6.2 for possible exceptions to this).
Such images are generated by first constructing a three-
dimensional model of an object (or person) that em-
bodies the desired object shape. The model is then
augmented to include color and texture. This complete
model is then illuminated with a virtual light source(s),
which can approximate a range of indoor or outdoor
lighting conditions. This virtual scene is then rendered
through a virtual camera to create a final image. Shown
in Figure 6, for example, is a partially textured three-
dimensional model of a person’s head and the final
rendered image.
Once the textured three-dimensional model is con-
structed, an image of the same object from any view-
point can be easily generated (e.g., we could view the
character in Figure 6 from the side, above, or behind).
Altering the pose of the object, however, is more in-
volved as it requires changing the underlying three-
dimensional model (e.g., animating the character in Fig-
ure 6 to nod her head requires updating the model
for each head pose – realistic animation of the human
form, however, is very difficult, see Section 6.3).
2.6 Painted
Starting with a blank screen, photo-editing software,
such as Photoshop, allows a user to create digital works
of art, similar to the way a painter would paint or draw
on a traditional canvas. Unlike the forms of tampering
described in the previous sections, this technique re-
quires a high degree of artistic and technical talent, is
very time consuming and is unlikely to yield particu-
larly realistic images.
3 The Child Pornography
Prevention Act
The 1996 Child Pornography Prevention Act (CPPA)
extended the existing federal criminal laws against child
pornography to include certain types of digital images [1].
The CPPA banned, in part, two different forms of “vir-
tual porn”:
§2256(8) child pornography means any vi-
sual depiction, including any photograph,
film, video, picture, or computer or computer-
generated image or picture, whether made
or produced by electronic, mechanical, or
other means, of sexually explicit conduct,
where:
(B) such visual depiction is, or ap-
pears to be, of a minor engaging
in sexually explicit conduct;
(C) such visual depiction has been
created, adapted, or modified to
appear that an identifiable minor
is engaging in sexually explicit con-
duct;
Part (B) bans virtual child pornography that appears to
depict minors but was produced by means other than
using real children, e.g., computer generated images,
Section 2.5. Part (C) prohibits virtual child pornogra-
phy generated using the more common compositing
and morphing techniques, Sections 2.1 and 2.2.
Composited, morphed and re-touched images typ-
ically originate in photographs of an actual individ-
ual. Computer generated images, on the other hand,
typically are generated in their entirety from a com-
puter model and thus do not depict any actual indi-
vidual (see Sections 6.1 and 6.2 for possible exceptions
to this). As we will see next, this distinction was criti-
cal to the United States Supreme Court’s consideration
of the constitutionality of the CPPA.
4 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition
In 2002, the United States Supreme Court considered
the constitutionality of the CPPA in Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coalition [2]. In their 6-3 ruling, the Court found
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that portions of the CPPA, being overly broad and re-
strictive, violated First Amendment rights. Of partic-
ular importance was the Courts ruling on the different
forms of “virtual porn” as described above. With re-
spect to §2256(8)(B) the Court wrote, in part:
Virtual child pornography is not “intrinsi-
cally related” to the sexual abuse of chil-
dren. While the Government asserts that
the images can lead to actual instances of
child abuse, the causal link is contingent
and indirect. The harm does not necessar-
ily follow from the speech, but depends upon
some unquantified potential for subsequent
criminal acts.
and went on to strike down this provision. With re-
spect to §2256(8)(C) the Court wrote, in part:
Although morphed images may fall within
the definition of virtual child pornography,
they implicate the interests of real children
and are in that sense closer to the images in
Ferber 1 Respondents do not challenge this
provision, and we do not consider it.
thus allowing this provision to stand. The Court, there-
fore, ruled that images containing a minor or portions
of a minor are not protected, while computer gener-
ated depicting a fictitious minor is constitutionally pro-
tected.
With respect to the various forms of digital tamper-
ing outlined in Section 2, we need to consider the ex-
tent to which painted, computer generated and certain
types of morphed and re-touched images can appear,
to the casual eye, as authentic. We will also consider
what technology is available to expose such images.
5 Is it Real or Virtual?
While the technology to alter digital media is devel-
oping at break-neck speeds, the technology to contend
with the ramifications is lagging seriously behind. My
students and I have been, for the past few years, devel-
oping a number of mathematical and computational
tools to detect various types of tampering in digital
media. Below I review some of this work (see also Ap-
pendix A).
1In New York v. Ferber (1982), United States Supreme Court up-
held a New York statute prohibiting the production, exhibition or
selling of any material that depicts any performance by a child un-
der the age of 16 that includes “actual or simulated sexual inter-
course, deviate sexual intercourse, sexual bestiality, masturbation,
sado-masochistic abuse or lewd exhibitions of the genitals.”
5.1 Morphed & Re-touched
We have developed some general techniques that can
be used to detect certain types of morphed and re-
touched 2 images. These tools work best on high-quality
and high-resolution digital images. I only briefly de-
scribe these techniques below – see the referenced full
papers for complete details.
5.1.1 Color Filter Array
Most digital cameras capture color images using a sin-
gle sensor in conjunction with an array of color filters.
As a result, only one third of the samples in a color im-
age are captured by the camera, the other two thirds
being interpolated. This interpolation introduces spe-
cific correlations between the samples of a color im-
age. When morphing or re-touching an image these
correlations may be destroyed or altered. We have de-
scribed the form of these correlations, and developed
a method that quantifies and detects them in any por-
tion of an image [11]. We have shown the general effec-
tiveness of this technique in detecting traces of digital
tampering, and analyzed its sensitivity and robustness
to simple counter-attacks.
5.1.2 Duplication
A common manipulation when altering an image is to
copy and paste portions of the image to conceal a per-
son or object in the scene. If the splicing is impercep-
tible, little concern is typically given to the fact that
identical (or virtually identical) regions are present in
the image. We have developed a technique that can
efficiently detect and localize duplicated regions in an
image [8]. This technique works by first applying a
principal component analysis (PCA) on small fixed-
size image blocks to yield a reduced dimension repre-
sentation. This representation is robust to minor vari-
ations in the image due to additive noise or lossy com-
pression. Duplicated regions are then detected by lexi-
cographically sorting all of the image blocks. We have
shown the efficacy of this technique on credible forg-
eries, and quantified its robustness and sensitivity to
additive noise and lossy JPEG compression.
2In the hands of an experienced user digital re-touching, as
shown in Figure 4, can shave a few years off of a person’s appear-
ance. These same techniques cannot, however transform an adult
(e.g., 25− 50 years old) into a child (e.g., 4 − 12 years old). These
techniques are simply insufficient to create the radical changes in
facial and body structure needed to produce such a young child.
Even though such images are currently constitutionally protected, it
is unreasonable, given the current technology, to assume that such
images do not depict actual minors.
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5.2 Computer Generated
Computer graphics rendering software is capable of
generating highly photorealistic images that are often
very difficult to differentiate from photographic im-
ages. We have, however, developed a method for dif-
ferentiating between photographic and computer gen-
erated (photorealistic) images. Specifically, we have
shown that a statisticalmodel based on first- and higher-
order wavelet statistics reveals subtle but significant
differences between photographic and photorealistic
images 3. I will review this technique below, and di-
rect the interested reader to [4, 7] for more details.
5.2.1 Statistical Model
We begin with an image decomposition based on sep-
arable quadrature mirror filters (QMFs). The decom-
position splits the frequency space into multiple ori-
entations (a vertical, a horizontal and a diagonal sub-
band) and scales. For a color (RGB) image, the decom-
position is applied independently to each color chan-
nel. The resulting vertical, horizontal and diagonal
subbands for scale i are denoted as V ci (x, y), H
c
i (x, y),
and Dci (x, y) respectively, where c ∈ {r, g, b}.
The first component of the statistical model consists
of the first four order statistics (mean, variance, skew-
ness and kurtosis) of the subband coefficient histograms
at each orientation, scale and color channel. While
these statistics describe the basic coefficient distribu-
tions, they are unlikely to capture the strong correla-
tions that exist across space, orientation and scale. For
example, salient image features such as edges tend to
orient spatially in certain direction and extend across
multiple scales. These image features result in sub-
stantial local energy across many scales, orientations
and spatial locations. The local energy can be roughly
measured by the magnitude of the QMF decomposi-
tion coefficients. As such, a strong coefficient in a hori-
zontal subband may indicate that its left and right spa-
tial neighbors in the same subband will also have a
large value. Similarly, if there is a coefficient with large
magnitude at scale i, it is also very likely that its “par-
ent” at scale i + 1 will also have a large magnitude.
In order to capture some of these higher-order sta-
tistical correlations, we collect a second set of statis-
tics that are based on the errors in a linear predictor of
coefficient magnitude. For the purpose of illustration,
consider first a vertical band of the green channel at
scale i, V gi (x, y). A linear predictor for the magnitude
of these coefficients in a subset of all possible spatial,
3We have used a similar technique to detect messages hidden
within digital images (steganography) [3, 5, 6].
orientation, scale and color neighbors is given by:
|V gi (x, y)| = w1|V
g
i (x− 1, y)|+ w2|V
g
i (x + 1, y)|
+ w3|V
g
i (x, y − 1)|+ w4|V
g
i (x, y + 1)|
+ w5|V
g
i+1(x/2, y/2)|+ w6|D
g
i (x, y)|
+ w7|D
g
i+1(x/2, y/2)|+ w8|V
r
i (x, y)|
+ w9|V
b
i (x, y)|, (1)
where |·|denotes absolute value and wk are the weights.
This linear relationship can be expressed more com-
pactly in matrix form as:
~v = Q~w, (2)
where~v contains the coefficient magnitudes of V gi (x, y)
strung out into a column vector, the columns of the
matrix Q contain the neighboring coefficient magni-
tudes as specified in Equation (1), and ~w = (w1 ... w9)
T .
The weights ~w are determined by minimizing the fol-
lowing quadratic error function:
E(~w) = [~v −Q~w]2. (3)
This error function is minimized by differentiating with
respect to ~w:
dE(~w)
d~w
= 2QT (~v −Q~w), (4)
setting the result equal to zero, and solving for ~w to
yield:
~w = (QT Q)−1QT~v, (5)
Given the large number of constraints (one per pixel)
in only nine unknowns, it is generally safe to assume
that the 9× 9 matrix QT Q will be invertible.
Given the linear predictor, the log error between the
actual coefficient and the predicted coefficient magni-
tudes is:
~p = log(~v)− log(|Q~w|), (6)
where the log(·) is computed point-wise on each vec-
tor component. This log error quantifies the correla-
tion of a subband with its neighbors. The mean, vari-
ance, skewness and kurtosis of this error are collected
to characterize its distribution. This process is repeated
for scales i = 1, ..., n− 1, and for the subbands V ri and
V bi , where the linear predictors for these subbands are
of the form:
|V ri (x, y)| = w1|V
r
i (x− 1, y)|+ w2|V
r
i (x + 1, y)|
+ w3|V
r
i (x, y − 1)|+ w4|V
r
i (x, y + 1)|
+ w5|V
r
i+1(x/2, y/2)|+ w6|D
r
i (x, y)|
+ w7|D
r
i+1(x/2, y/2)|+ w8|V
g
i (x, y)|
+ w9|V
b
i (x, y)|, (7)
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and
|V bi (x, y)| = w1|V
b
i (x− 1, y)|+ w2|V
b
i (x + 1, y)|
+ w3|V
b
i (x, y − 1)|+ w4|V
b
i (x, y + 1)|
+ w5|V
b
i+1(x/2, y/2)|+ w6|D
b
i (x, y)|
+ w7|D
b
i+1(x/2, y/2)|+ w8|V
r
i (x, y)|
+ w9|V
g
i (x, y)|. (8)
A similar process is repeated for the horizontal and di-
agonal subbands. As an example, the predictor for the
green channel takes the form:
|Hgi (x, y)| = w1|H
g
i (x− 1, y)|+ w2|H
g
i (x + 1, y)|
+ w3|H
g
i (x, y − 1)|+ w4|H
g
i (x, y + 1)|
+ w5|H
g
i+1(x/2, y/2)|+ w6|D
g
i (x, y)|
+ w7|D
g
i+1(x/2, y/2)|+ w8|H
r
i (x, y)|
+ w9|H
b
i (x, y)|, (9)
and
|Dgi (x, y)| = w1|D
g
i (x− 1, y)|+ w2|D
g
i (x + 1, y)|
+ w3|D
g
i (x, y − 1)|+ w4|D
g
i (x, y + 1)|
+ w5|D
g
i+1(x/2, y/2)|+ w6|H
g
i (x, y)|
+ w7|V
g
i (x, y)|+ w8|D
r
i (x, y)|
+ w9|D
b
i (x, y)|. (10)
For the horizontal and diagonal subbands, the predic-
tor for the red and blue channels are determined in
a similar way as was done for the vertical subbands,
Equations (7)-(8). For each oriented, scale and color
subband, a similar error metric, Equation(6), and error
statistics are computed.
For a multi-scale decomposition with scales
i = 1, ..., n, the total number of basic coefficient statis-
tics is 36(n− 1) (12(n − 1) per color channel), and the
total number of error statistics is also 36(n− 1), yield-
ing a grand total of 72(n− 1) statistics. These statistics
form the feature vector to be used to discriminate be-
tween photographic and photorealistic images.
5.2.2 Classification
From the measured statistics of a training set of images
labeled as photographic or photorealistic, our goal is to
build a classifier that can determine to which category
a novel test image belongs. To this end, a support vec-
tor machine (SVM) is employed. I will briefly describe,
in increasing complexity, three classes of SVMs. The
first, linear separable case is mathematically the most
straight-forward. The second, linear non-separable case,
contends with situations in which a solution cannot be
found in the former case. The third, non-linear case,
affords the most flexible classification scheme and of-
ten gives the best classification accuracy.
Linear Separable SVM: Denote the tuple (~xi, yi) , i =
1, ..., N as exemplars from a training set of photographic
and photorealistic images. The column vector ~xi con-
tains the measured image statistics as outlined in the
previous section, and yi = −1 for photorealistic im-
ages, and yi = 1 for photographic images. The linear
separable SVM classifier amounts to a hyperplane that
separates the positive and negative exemplars. Points
which lie on the hyperplane satisfy the constraint:
~wt~xi + b = 0, (11)
where ~w is normal to the hyperplane, |b|/||~w|| is the
perpendicular distance from the origin to the hyper-
plane, and || · || denotes the Euclidean norm. Define
now the margin for any given hyperplane to be the
sum of the distances from the hyperplane to the near-
est positive and negative exemplar. The separating
hyperplane is chosen so as to maximize the margin.
If a hyperplane exists that separates all the data then,
within a scale factor:
~wt~xi + b ≥ 1, if yi = 1 (12)
~wt~xi + b ≤ −1, if yi = −1. (13)
These pair of constraints can be combined into a single
set of inequalities:
(~wt~xi + b) yi − 1 ≥ 0, i = 1, ..., N. (14)
For any given hyperplane that satisfies this constraint,
the margin is 2/||~w||. We seek, therefore, to minimize
||~w||2 subject to the constraints in Equation (14).
For largely computational reasons, this optimiza-
tion problem is reformulated using Lagrange multipli-
ers, yielding the following Lagrangian:
L(~w, b, α1, ..., αN) =
1
2
||~w||2
−
N∑
i=1
αi (~w
t~xi + b) yi
+
N∑
i=1
αi, (15)
where αi are the positive Lagrange multipliers. This
error function should be minimized with respect to ~w
and b, while requiring that the derivatives of L(·) with
respect to each αi is zero and constraining αi ≥ 0,
for all i. Because this is a convex quadratic program-
ming problem, a solution to the dual problem yields
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the same solution for ~w, b, and α1, ..., αN. In the dual
problem, the same error function L(·) is maximized
with respect to αi, while requiring that the derivatives
of L(·) with respect to ~w and b are zero and the con-
straint that αi ≥ 0. Differentiating with respect to ~w
and b, and setting the results equal to zero yields:
~w =
N∑
i=1
αi~xiyi (16)
N∑
i=1
αiyi = 0. (17)
Substituting these equalities back into Equation (15)
yields:
LD =
N∑
i=1
αi −
1
2
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
αiαj~x
t
i~xjyiyj . (18)
Maximization of this error function may be realized
using any of a number of general purpose optimiza-
tion packages that solve linearly constrained convex
quadratic problems.
A solution to the linear separable classifier, if it ex-
ists, yields values of αi, from which the normal to the
hyperplane can be calculated as in Equation (16), and
from the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) condition:
b =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
yi − ~w
t~xi
)
, (19)
for all i, such that αi 6= 0. From the separating hyper-
plane, ~w and b, a novel exemplar, ~z, can be classified by
simply determining on which side of the hyperplane it
lies. If the quantity ~wt~z + b is greater than or equal to
zero, then the exemplar is classified as photographic,
otherwise the exemplar is classified as photorealistic.
Linear Non-Separable SVM: It is possible, and even
likely, that the linear separable SVM will not yield a so-
lution when, for example, the training data do not uni-
formly lie on either side of a separating hyperplane.
Such a situation can be handled by softening the ini-
tial constraints of Equation (12) and (13). Specifically,
these constraints are modified with “slack” variables,
ξi, as follows:
~wt~xi + b ≥ 1− ξi, if yi = 1 (20)
~wt~xi + b ≤ −1 + ξi, if yi = −1, (21)
with ξi ≥ 0, i = 1, ..., N . A training exemplar which
lies on the “wrong” side of the separating hyperplane
will have a value of ξi greater than unity. We seek
a hyperplane that minimizes the total training error,∑
i ξi, while still maximizing the margin. A simple
error function to be minimized is ||~w||2/2 + C
∑
i ξi,
where C is a user selected scalar value, whose cho-
sen value controls the relative penalty for training er-
rors. Minimization of this error is still a quadratic pro-
gramming problem. Following the same procedure as
the previous section, the dual problem is expressed as
maximizing the error function:
LD =
N∑
i=1
αi −
1
2
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
αiαj~x
t
i~xjyiyj , (22)
with the constraint that 0 ≤ αi ≤ C . Note that this is
the same error function as before, Equation (18) with
the slightly different constraint that αi is bounded above
by C . Maximization of this error function and compu-
tation of the hyperplane parameters are accomplished
as described in the previous section.
Non-Linear SVM: Fundamental to the SVMs outlined
in the previous two sections is the limitation that the
classifier is constrained to a linear hyperplane. It is of-
ten the case that a non-linear separating surface greatly
improves classification accuracy. Non-linear SVMs af-
ford such a classifier by first mapping the training ex-
emplars into a higher (possibly infinite) dimensional
Euclidean space in which a linear SVM is then em-
ployed. Denote this mapping as:
Φ : L → H, (23)
which maps the original training data from L into H.
Replacing ~xi with Φ(~xi) everywhere in the training por-
tion of the linear separable or non-separable SVMs of
the previous sections yields an SVM in the higher-
dimensional space H.
It can, unfortunately, be quite inconvenient to work
in the space H as this space can be considerably larger
than the original L, or even infinite. Note, however,
that the error function of Equation (22) to be maxi-
mized depends only on the inner products of the train-
ing exemplars, ~xti~xj . Given a “kernel” function such
that:
K(~xi, ~xj) = Φ(~xi)
tΦ(~xj), (24)
an explicit computation of Φ can be completely avoided.
There are several choices for the form of the kernel
function, for example, radial basis functions or polyno-
mials. Replacing the inner products Φ(~xi)tΦ(~xj) with
the kernel function K(~xi, ~xj) yields an SVM in the space
H with minimal computational impact over working
in the original space L.
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With the training stage complete, recall that a novel
exemplar, ~z, is classified by determining on which side
of the separating hyperplane (specified by ~w and b) it
lies. Specifically, if the quantity ~wtΦ(~z) + b is greater
than or equal to zero, then the exemplar is classified
as photographic, otherwise the exemplar is classified
photorealistic. The normal to the hyperplane, ~w, of
course now lives in the space H, making this testing
impractical. As in the training stage, the classifica-
tion can again be performed via inner products. From
Equation (16):
~wtΦ(~z) + b =
N∑
i=1
αiΦ(~xi)
tΦ(~z)yi + b
=
N∑
i=1
αiK(~xi, ~z)yi + b. (25)
Thus both the training and classification can be per-
formed in the higher-dimensional space, affording a
more flexible separating hyperplane and hence better
classification accuracy. We next show the performance
of a non-linear SVM in the classification of images as
photographic or photorealistic. The SVMs classify im-
ages based on the statistical feature vector as described
in Section 5.2.1
5.2.3 Results
We have constructed a database of 40, 000photographic
and 6, 000 photorealistic images4. All of the images
consist of a broad range of indoor and outdoor scenes,
and the photorealistic images were rendered using a
number of different software packages (e.g., 3D Studio
Max, Maya, SoftImage 3D, PovRay, Lightwave 3D and
Imagine). All of the images are color (RGB), JPEG com-
pressed (with an average quality of 90%), and typically
on the order of 600× 400 pixels in size.
From this database of 46,000 images, statistics as de-
scribed in Section 5.2.1 were extracted. To accommo-
date different image sizes, only the central 256×256 re-
gion of each image was considered. For each image re-
gion, a four-level three-orientation QMF pyramid was
constructed for each color channel, from which a 216-
dimensional feature vector (72 per color channel) of co-
efficient and error statistics was collected.
From the 46,000 feature vectors, 32,000 photographic
and 4,800 photorealistic feature vectors were used to
train a non-linear SVM. The remaining feature vectors
were used to test the classifier. In the results presented
4The photographic images were downloaded from
www.freefoto.com, the photorealistic images were downloaded
from www.raph.com and www.irtc.org.
here, the training/testing split was done randomly –
the average testing classification accuracy over 100 such
splits is reported. With a 0.5% false-negative rate (a
photorealistic image mis-classified as photographic),
the SVM correctly correctly classified 72% of the pho-
tographic images.
5.3 Painted
As described in Section 2.6, realistic digitally painted
images are extremely difficult to create. I believe, nev-
ertheless, that the technique described in the previous
section for differentiating between photographic and
computer generated images will also able to differenti-
ate between photographic and painted images. I have
not, however, tested this directly for lack of the appro-
priate data (i.e., realisticly painted images).
6 Modern Technology
As computer and imaging technology continues to de-
velop, the distinction between real and virtual will be-
come increasingly more difficult to make. These days
computer generated images, as described in Section 2.5,
are typically generated entirely within the confines of a
computer and the imagination of the artist/programmer.
The creation of these images, therefore, do not involve
photographs of actual people. With respect to child
pornography, such images are currently constitution-
ally protected.
I describe below three emerging technologies that
employ people in various stages of computer gener-
ated imaging. These technologies have emerged in or-
der to allow for the creation of more realistic images.
While not yet readily available, I believe that these tech-
nologies will eventually make it increasingly more dif-
ficult to determine if a person was involved in any
stage of the creation of a computer generated image.
6.1 Image-Based Rendering
The appearance of computer generated images, as de-
scribed in Section 2.5, is typically dictated by the color
and texture that is mapped onto the virtual object or
person. Image-based rendering allows for actual pho-
tographs to be mapped directly onto the rendered ob-
ject or person. For example, in creating a virtual per-
son, the three-dimensional model may be created by
the computer, and a photograph of a real person over-
layed onto that model. The resulting rendered image
is part real and part virtual – though the underlying
three-dimensional shape of the person is virtual, the
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Figure 8: The 3-D motion capture system by Meta-
Motion.
image may contain recognizable features of a real per-
son.
6.2 3-D Laser Scanning
Computer generated images, as described in Section 2.5,
are generated by first constructing a three-dimensional
model of an object or person. Computer graphics soft-
ware provides a number of convenient tools to aid in
creating such models.
A number of commercially available scanners di-
rectly generate a three-dimensional model of an actual
object or person. The Cyberware whole body scan-
ner, for example, captures (in less than 17 seconds) the
three-dimensional shape and color of the entire human
body, Figure 7. Shown in this figure is the scanner and
five views of a full-body scan. This scanned model
can then be imported into a computer graphics soft-
ware and texture mapped as desired. The resulting
rendered image is part real and part virtual – though
the image may not be recognized as a real person, the
underlying three-dimensional model is that of a real
person.
6.3 3-D Motion Capture
If you have seen any computer animated movie
(e.g., Toy Story, Shrek, etc.), you may have noticed that
the motion of human characters often looks stilted and
awkward. At least two reasons for this are that the
biomechanics of human motion are very difficult to
model and recreate, and we seem to have an intensely
acute sensitivity to human motion (e.g., long before we
can clearly see their face, we can often recognize a fa-
miliar person from their gait).
A number of commercially available systems can
capture the three-dimensional motion of a human as
they undergo complex motions. Motion capture sys-
tems, such as that shown in Figure 8, measure the three-
dimensional position of several key points on the hu-
man body, typically at the joints. This data can then
be used to animate a completely computer generated
person. The resulting animation is part real and part
virtual – while the character does not depict a real per-
son, the underlying motion is that of a real person.
7 Discussion
Today’s technology allows digital media to be altered
and manipulated in ways that were simply impossi-
ble 20 years ago. Tomorrow’s technology will almost
certainly allow for us to manipulate digital media in
ways that today seem unimaginable. And as this tech-
nology continues to evolve it will become increasingly
more difficult for the courts, the media and, in general,
the average person to keep pace with understanding
its power and it limits.
I have tried in this report to review some of the cur-
rent digital technology that allows for images to be cre-
ated and altered, with the hope that it will help the
courts and others grapple with some difficult technical
and legal issues currently facing us. It is also my hope
that the mathematical and computational techniques
that we have developed (and continue to develop) will
help the courts contend with this exciting and at times
puzzling digital age.
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Figure 7: The whole body 3-D scanner by Cyberware and five views of a full-body scan.
A Exposing Digital Composites
In addition to the development of a technique to dif-
ferentiate between photographic and computer gen-
erated images, we have developed techniques to de-
tect traces of tampering in photographic images that
would result from digital image compositing, Section 2.1.
These approaches work on the assumption that although
digital forgeries may leave no visual clues of having
been tampered with, they may, nevertheless, alter the
underlying statistics of an image. Described below are
four techniques for detecting various forms of digital
tampering (also applicable are the two techniques de-
scribed in Section 5.1). Provided are only brief descrip-
tions – see the referenced full papers for complete de-
tails.
A.1 Re-Sampling
Consider the creation of a digital image that shows
a pair of famous movie stars, rumored to have a ro-
mantic relationship, walking hand-in-hand. Such an
image could be created by splicing together individ-
ual images of each movie star and overlaying the dig-
itally created composite onto a sunset beach. In order
to create a convincing match, it is often necessary to
re-size, rotate, or stretch portions of the images. This
process requires re-sampling the original image onto
a new sampling lattice. Although this re-sampling is
often imperceptible, it introduces specific correlations
into the image, which when detected can be used as
evidence of digital tampering. We have described the
form of these correlations and how they can be auto-
matically detected in any portion of an image [9]. We
have shown the general effectiveness of this technique
and analyzed its sensitivity and robustness to simple
counter-attacks.
A.2 Double JPEG Compression
Tampering with a digital image requires the use of a
photo-editing software such as Adobe PhotoShop. In
the making of digital forgeries an image is loaded into
the editing software, some manipulations are performed
and the image is re-saved. Since most images are stored
in JPEG format (e.g., a majority of digital cameras store
images directly in JPEG format), it is likely that both
the original and forged images are stored in this for-
mat. Notice that in this scenario the forged image is
double JPEG compressed. Double JPEG compression
introduces specific artifacts not present in singly com-
pressed images [10]. These artifacts can be used as
evidence of digital tampering. Note, however, that
double JPEG compression does not necessarily prove
malicious tampering. For example, it is possible for a
user to simply re-save a high quality JPEG image with
a lower quality. The authenticity of a double JPEG
compressed image should, nevertheless, be called into
question.
A.3 Signal to Noise
Digital images have an inherent amount of noise in-
troduced either by the imaging process or digital com-
pression. The amount of noise is typically uniform
across the entire image. If two images with different
noise levels are spliced together, or if small amounts
of noise are locally added to conceal traces of tamper-
ing, then variations in the signal to noise ratio (SNR)
across the image can be used as evidence of tamper-
ing. Measuring the SNR is non-trivial in the absence of
the original signal. We have shown how a blind SNR
estimators can be employed to locally measure noise
variance [10]. Differences in the noise variance across
the image can be used as evidence of digital tamper-
ing.
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A.4 Gamma Correction
In order to enhance the perceptual quality of digital
images, digital cameras often introduce some form of
luminance non-linearity. The parameters of this non-
linearity are usually dynamically chosen and depend
on the camera and scene dynamics — these parameters
are, however, typically held constant within an image.
The presence of several distinct non-linearities in an
image is a sign of possible tampering. For example,
imagine a scenario where two images are spliced to-
gether. If the images were taken with different cameras
or in different lightning conditions, then it is likely that
different non-linearities are present in the composite
image. It is also possible that local non-linearities are
applied in the composite image in order to create a
convincing luminance match. We have shown that a
non-linear transformation introduces specific correla-
tions in the Fourier domain [10]. These correlations
can be detected and estimated using tools from polyspec-
tral analysis. This technique is employed to detect if an
image contains multiple non-linearities, as might re-
sult from digital tampering.
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